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Kajian ini mengkaji pengaruh struktur tadbir urus korporat dalam prestasi bank di Turki. 
Rangka kerja kajian ini telah dibangunkan oleh teori agensi. Keseluruhannya, dapatan 
kajian ini menyokong teori ini. Sektor perbankan mengalami cabaran dari segi persaingan 
sengit dan perubahan dalam jangkaan pelanggan di kebelakangan tahun-tahun ini 
terutamanya setelah kemurungan ekonomi di peringkat dunia. Perhatian dalam struktur 
tadbir urus korporat di institusi kewangan semakin meningkat disebabkan oleh perubahan 
yang timbul di sosial-politik. Oleh itu, penilaian dan pemantauan prestasi bank menjadi 
penting kepada pihak-pihak seperti pemegang saham, pelabur berpotensi, pemiutang, 
pelanggan, pekerja dan pihak penguatkuasa. Kajian ini fokus kepada hubungan antara 
pemegang saham dan pengurusan. Selain itu, kajian ini juga memilih 33 bank sebagai 
sampel yang disenaraikan di bursa saham Istanbul di negara Turki sepanjang tempoh 
tahun 2004 sehingga 2010 untuk mengkaji pengaruh struktur tadbir urus korporat 
terhadap prestasi bank di Turki. Empat pembolehubah untuk struktur tadbir urus korporat 
adalah saiz lembaga pengarah, berbelah bahagi tugasan ketua pegawai eksekutif, tempoh 
perkhidmatan ketua pegawai eksekutif dan saiz jawatankuasa audit  telah digunakan 
dalam kajian ini. Dua ukuran prestasi bank adalah pulangan atas aset (ROA) dan aliran 
tunai operasi (OCF). Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa struktur tadbir urus korporat (saiz 
lembaga pengarah) mempunyai pengaruh yang positif dan signifikan terhadap pulang atas 
aset. Sementara itu, tadbir urus korporat (berbelah bahagi tugasan ketua eksekutif, 
tempoh perkhidmatan ketua pegawai eksekutif, saiz jawatankuasa audit) mempunyai 
pengaruh yang negatif terhadap pulangan ke atas aset. Di samping itu, tadbir urus 
korporat (saiz lembaga pengarah dan tempoh perkhidmatan ketua pegawai eksekutif) 
mempunyai pengaruh yang negatif ke atas aliran tunai operasi. Sementara itu, tadbir urus 
korporat (berbelah bahagi tugasan ketua pegawai eksekutif dan saiz jawatankuasa audit) 
mempunyai pengaruh yang positif ke atas aliran tunai operasi. Hasil kajian ini dijangka 
menyumbang kepada kesusasteraan mengenai prestasi bank dimana pengetahuan yang 
lebih mendalam dan amalan pengurusan bank-bank boleh ditambahbaikkan dengan 
membuat keputusan yang tepat untuk meningkatkan prestasi bank. 
 
Kata Kunci: Saiz lembaga pengarah, Berbelah bahagi tugasan ketua eksekutif 
pengawai, Tempoh perkhidmatan ketua eksekutif pengarah, saiz 






This study investigates the influence of the corporate governance structure on bank 
performance in Turkey. The framework of this study has been developed by agency 
theory. Finding of this study support this theory and decision making. Banking sector has 
seen strong competition and changes in customer’s expectations over the last few years 
especially after the world economic slowdown .The importance and increasing attention 
of the corporate governance in financial institutions tends to be accredited to the socio-
political changes that have been arisen. Therefore, evaluating banks’ performance and 
monitoring their financial positions are important to many parties, such as stockholders, 
potential investors, creditors, customers, employees, and regulators. The current study 
focuses on the relationship between stockholders and management, As well as, the research will 
investigate the banks which are listed in Istanbul stock exchange. Based on a sample of 33 
banks listed on Istanbul stock exchange in Turkey over the period 2004 to 2010, this 
research investigates the influences of corporate governance structure on bank 
performance in Turkey. Four variables of corporate governance structures which are 
board size, CEO duality, CEO tenure, and audit committee size, were used in this study. 
Two measures of bank performance are considered which are returns on assets (ROA) 
and operating cash flow (OCF). In Turkish banks, the result showed that the corporate 
governance board size has a positive and significant influence on return on asset. 
Meanwhile, corporate governance CEO duality, CEO tuner, and size of audit committee 
had a negative influence with return on asset. In addition, corporate governance board 
size and CEO tuner had a negative influence on the operating cash flow. Meanwhile, 
corporate governance (CEO duality and audit committee size) had a positive influence on 
the operating cash flow. The results of the study are expected to contribute to literatures 
on bank performance to which knowledge was added, and to the practices of the banks 
management to make better decision to enhance the bank performance by incorporating 
the effects of corporate performance structure.  
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1.1  Introduction  
 
 Corporate governance is one of the topics of great interest to many researchers in 
many branches of knowledge (Demirag, 2005). It is a whole series of regulatory and 
financial mechanisms aimed at reducing conflicts of interest between management and 
owners of the capital investing in the banks. (Vafeas, 2000). Therefore, corporate 
governance tends to protect the owners of the capital from the opportunistic behavior, and 
make the managers work to achieve the interests of the owners particularly the 
shareholders (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2008).  
 
Corporate governance has also become an important topic to all institutions and 
regional and international organizations, after a long series of various financial crises that 
have occurred in many banks, especially in the developed countries, such as the financial 
crashes that have occurred in several countries in East Asia and Latin America in 1997, 
the company Enron crisis, which had been working in the marketing of electricity and 
natural gas in the United States of America in 2001, as well as the crises of the American 
company WorldCom communications in 2002 (Uzun, Samuel & Raj, 2004) which force 
policy maker to revise the codes and rules about companies like what US congress done 
in 2002 as known Sarbanes Oxley act , and later on many other acts in order to strengthen 
the code of companies which lead to minimize the collapse and crisis in the companies.  
The contents of 
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